Table Of Contents
Open Table Of Contents
Background: A Nation on the Brink
The 1989 Democratic Movement, referred to officially by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a “political turmoil between the Spring and Summer of 1989,” was a series of student-led protests centered in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, China, lasting from 15 April to 4 June 1989. During these uproars, two prevailing factions emerged within the Deng Xiaoping led CCP: the moderates, who advocated for dialogue and moderation, and the hardliners, who supported a strict crackdown on the demonstrations. This internal party conflict culminated in the hardliners gaining the upper hand: after weeks of struggle between student protestors and the CCP to resolve issues such as inflation, corruption, and restrictions on political participation peacefully, the government declared martial law on the night of June 3rd and deployed troops to violently clear the square in what is known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre. With casualty figures ranging widely in reports from both official Chinese sources and Western media, the violent suppression resulted in an estimated 200 to 10,000 civilian deaths.
Given the significant internal and external opposition, why were the hardliners still able to eventually dominate the moderates and enforce such a violent suppression of the demonstrations? The hardliners’ plan for a violent oppression prevailed due to their firm stance on maintaining social order and party authority, which they argued was essential to prevent the country from slipping into the chaos reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. This approach not only ended the unrest almost immediately but also set a precedent for harshly handling political dissent, influencing China’s policies on democratic reforms to this day.
Moderate vs. Hardline: A Party Divided
Even from the earlier stages of the protests, it has been a common belief among government officials that pacifying the protests promptly, regardless of the consequences, was necessary to prioritize the country’s stable and peaceful development. When the first major protests took place, the moderates, led by Zhao Ziyang, one of Deng Xiaoping’s expected successors, advocated for an open dialogue with the protestors while the hardliners, led by Li Peng, the Premier of the State Council, had been in conflict with them over this approach. In a meeting with the CCP Politburo’s Standing Committee on May 1, Zhao and Li once again clashed over this issue.
Representing the moderate faction, Zhao rejected the hardliners’ proposal and underscored a possibility for social reform and transparency, claiming that “the previous methods used by the hardliners are proven ineffective given the developments in the past weeks, and thus the government’s special permission for this movement is the only viable option.” This statement highlights Zhao’s propensity towards a more conciliatory approach, that engagement rather than suppression would lead to a more stable resolution. Zhao’s speech also highlights a fundamental division within the party’s leadership over the openness towards accommodating political reforms. This inter-faction conflict, however, became the main force delaying any substantial act from both parties for almost half a month.
According to sociologist Ezra F. Vogel, while Li believed the stable development of the nation should take precedence over everything else, Zhao countered that the Chinese government should publicly support the expansion of democracy and increase political transparency. Li’s insistence on stable development echoed earlier sentiments within the party that harsh measures were necessary to maintain order, reflecting a continuity of thought that favored immediate suppression to safeguard the nation’s progress. The ideological division between Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang, or the hardliners and the moderates, underscores the tensions within the CCP that intensified the later decisions to prioritize stability over reform.
The Failure of Dialogue
As two opinions clashed within the party, an attempt was made by the moderates to end the protests through formal dialogue between student leaders and party representatives; however, the failure of this act undermined Zhao’s effort for a peaceful resolution and further fueled the government’s eventual decision to take drastic measures. After the Politburo meeting, Zhao actively opened up news media to report on the development of the protests; delivered two speeches demonstrating sympathy with the demonstrators between May 3 and May 4; and even successfully organized a public discussion with the student leaders. According to Chinese historian and sociologist Zhao Dingxin, Zhao mentioned several times in his speeches that the students’ concerns about government corruption were legitimate and also considered the student movement to be an understandable expression of patriotism.
Zhao’s direct communication with the protestors, more than a validation of the demonstrators’ grievances, reflected a belief in constructive engagement as a means to resolve conflict. Although this lenient approach initially succeeded in pausing the protests, the resolution was proven to be short-lived. After almost all universities in Beijing announced the end of the strike by May 4th, student leaders Wang Dan and Orkesh Dolet reignited the protests by initiating another round of hunger strikes on May 11th. In a speech to his fellow student protestors, Wang Dan expressed distrust towards the government’s proposal for open conversation, stating, “The ‘dialogue’ proposed by the Chinese government is merely a tactic to deceive and subdue the students.”
This hostile perception of the government’s motive challenges the effectiveness of the moderate approach and demonstrates the complexity of addressing political and social grievances through dialogue alone. The breakdown of Zhao Ziyang’s peaceful initiatives served as final pivots within the government towards adopting more severe action to end the unrest.
The Turn Toward Suppression
As the protests once again escalated uncontrollably, the hardliners decided to prevent further escalation by declaring martial law, ultimately leading to the tragic events that followed. By this point, the protests had continued for nearly two months, and even certain moderates had shifted toward supporting violent policies. Political Scientist Andrew J. Nathan notes that another meeting with the Politburo was held by Deng. During this meeting, Zhao’s conciliatory approach was criticized by most members, including Li Peng, who argued that Zhao’s May 4th speeches had made the students no longer fear the Chinese government.
Deng also warned that “if the ongoing protests in Beijing were not quickly quelled, China would risk experiencing another civil war or a Cultural Revolution,” a sentiment echoed by other conservative members of the committee. The passage highlights the moments leading to the escalation of violence in Tiananmen Square, since the hardliners’ decision to declare martial law was not merely a reaction to the protests but also a strategic move to reassert control and prevent perceived threats to national stability. This approach, as noted in Deng’s warnings, was fueled by the fear of repeating historical upheavals like the Cultural Revolution, which only ended 13 years at this point. Deng, as the top military commander of the CCP, remained firm on the need for violent clearance and attributes the escalating crisis to the moderates’ approach.
In his late published diary, Li Peng documents that Deng Xiaoping personally chaired a final meeting on May 19 to plan the logistics of the suppression with the Politburo Standing Committee and stated that implementing martial law was the only option. During this assembly, Deng declared that he had mistakenly chosen Zhao Ziyang as his successor and decided to therefore exclude Zhao from senior leadership meetings, vowing to take a hard line against Zhao’s supporters and to begin a propaganda campaign to that effect. By blaming the moderates, Deng not only justified his harsh measures but also strategically shifted the narrative within the party to consolidate his power and discredit his rivals. His decision to exclude Zhao Ziyang from leadership meetings serves also as a prime example for the punitive measures taken against perceived dissent within the CCP. The violent clearance was then carried out on June 4th and the protests were characterized as an anti revolutionary riot.
Legacy and Reflection
The 1989 Democratic Movement, marked by the potential for China to embrace democratic principles, was instead met with severe suppression by hardline leaders within the CCP. Today, this event continues to influence China’s political decisions. As authorities deny its occurrence and hide the true death toll, it can be speculated as a lost opportunity for democracy that still resonates within the country’s strict governance framework.